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NOTE AND COMMENT 
Tm: DOMICILE OF A WIFE.-In 1go8 Professor Dicey stated flatly, as a 
rule of the EngJish law without exceptions, that the domicile of a married 
w'oman during coverture is the same as that of her husband, and changes 
with his.1 It is a rule which makes for hard cases and offers constant fu.vi-
tations for exceptions to meet the situations it creates. Must a deserted 
wife follow her husband to the ends of the earth to secure the domicjliary 
jurisdiction for divorce? May he, by shifting his own place of permanent 
residence, arbitra~ily deprive her of capacity to make a will, or determine 
the law to govern the devolution of the property upon her dying intestate? 
Where can: she vote? 
Despite the hardships, the rule has been consistently followed in Eng-
land,2 though with some departures in colonial decisions.a In a tight place, 
1 DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws [2nd ed.], 124, 132, 134. 
2 The cases of Deck v. Deck, z Sw. & Tr. 90, and Santo Teodoro v. Santo Teodoro, 
L. R. 5, P. Div. 79, allowed a wife to maintain a divorce suit in England when the 
domicile of the husband was elsewhere. But in the later decision of Le Mesurier v. 
Le Mesurier, [1895] A. C. 517, the doctrine that domicile is essential as a foundation 
for divorce jurisdiction was conclusively settled. 
1 Ho-a·mie v. Ho·a-mie, 6 Viet. Rep. (2 P. & M.) 113; overruled by Forster v. 
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the court has preferred to encroach upon the requirement that domicile-is 
the basis of divorce jurisdiction, rather than admit the possibility of a mar-
ried woman's separate domicile.4 So it is not so surprising to find a strong 
reiteration of the principle of inseparability of the domiciles of husband and 
wife in a recent House of Lords case. 5 
A Scotchman married a Scotchwoman, and for a time resided with her 
in Aberdeen. He contracted dissipated habits, and with the wife's consent 
it was arranged that he should go to Australia. He established a domicile 
in Queensland, and contracted a bigamous marriage there. When the wife 
heard of this she instituted divorce proceedings in Scotland, ~here she had 
remained, but died before their termination. Upon the question of legacy 
a.nd succession duty, it was held that the duty was not payable in the United 
Kingdom, as the deceased died domiciled in Queensland. 
The decision called for by the facts is but a reaffirmation of the refusal 
to make exception to the unity of the domicile of husband and wife. It 
still leaves it an open question whether a judicial separation, or divorce a 
mensa et tlwro, empowers the wife to establish a domicile of her own. It 
simply follows previous authority in insisting that the mere fact of conduct 
on the part of the husband which would relieve her of the duty to live with 
him, or furnish her grounds for divorce or separation, does not alone make 
it possible to establish such separate domicile.e 
The court seems anxious, so far as it can, to shut off possibility of excep-
tions to its general rule. Previous cases had suggested that there might be 
situations where the wife's domicile would not follow that of the husband, 
as, for instance, where he deserted her.7 These suggestiO'DS receive rough 
Forster, [1907], Viet. L. Rep. 159; Martin v. Martin, 17 N. Z. L. R. 126 (wife per· 
mitted to sue for divorce at last common domicile, though husband had gone elsewhere); 
Poingdestre v. Poingdestre, 28 N. Z. L. R. 604 (statute provided that when husband 
deserted the wife "shall be deemed " * " to have retained her New Zealand domicile"); 
Protapsaltis v. Protapsaltis, [1918], Queensland St. Rep. 270 (wife permitted to sue for 
divorce in the domicile where she was deserted by husband. 
•As witness a case like Stathatos v. Stathatos, [1913], P. 46. An English girl mar-
ried a Greek domiciled in England. Later he returned to Greece; the marriage was 
annulled because there was ·no Greek priest present at the ceremony, and the Greek 
remarried. The wife sued for divorce in England and got it, despite the court's reluc-
tance in "giving the go·hy to " " " the rule " " " that the wife's domicile is the husband's 
domicile." In de l\fontaigu v. de Montaigu, [1913], P. 154, ·a case presenting the 
identical problem, the court says that an exception is being made to the ordinary rule 
that domicile governs, because of the hardship involved. The hardship comes because 
the English court in Ogden v. Ogden, [1908], P. 46, refused to recognize the effect of 
a French decree of nullity of a marriage based upon the same jurisdictional facts con-
sidered sufficient in England for its courts. See "Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage," 
32 HAl<v. L. REV. 806, 818. So the plaintiff, like Kipling's Towlinso11, belongs in neither 
place. Greece says she is not and never was married to her erstwhile husband, and has 
no place there; England says she is married to a Greek and domiciled in Greece. 
•Lord Advocate v. Joffrey, 89 L. J. Rep. (P. C.) 209. 
8 Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390; Yelverton v. Yelverton, I Sw. Tr. 574; In re 
Mackenzie, [19u], 1 Ch. 578. 
1 See Lord Cranworth, in Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390, 419; Sir R. T. Philli-
more, in Le Sueur v. Le Sueur, L. R. 1, P. D. 139, where the court assumes "that 
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treatment,8 and the court concludes that the "only safe course is to keep 
close to the well-established rule that the domicile of a husband and wife, 
undivorced and unseparated, is one and the same." The House of Lords 
stands pat. 
That the married woman always had her husband's domicile, and could 
have no other, was a :necessary conclusion from the position the common 
law took with regard to the wife; her "very being or legal existence * * * 
is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband."O It would be pedantry to demonstrate that this 
brutal fiction has vanished.10 
It is said, however, that, despite the fact that the wife's person is no 
longer identified with that of her husbanu, the family is still the unit upon 
which our civilization is built; that the family must be organized-located-
and some one must determine where its headquarters are to be. Since the 
husband usually bears the responsibility for the family support, he should 
determine the location of the family home.11 
Members of a family ordinarily do have a common home, and it is sit-
uated where its head, the husband and father, establishes it. A fictitious 
unity of persO!ll is unnecessary to give legal effect to this fact. The wife, 
upon marriage, takes, by law, the husband's domicile.12 She need go to the 
place to acquire it.13 And, normally, when the husband changes his domicile 
that of the wife will change, too.14 Does it necessarily follow that the law 
shall say that she cannot acquire a separate domicile when she does in fact 
couple physical presence with an inte'Iit to make a permanent abode at a 
place other than the domicile of the husband? 
American courts have already gone a long way in recognizing the pos-
sibility of a separate domicile for the wife. If the husband deserts her, he 
cannot move her domicile with his, to deprive her of the privilege to sue 
desertion on the part of the husband may entitle the wife, without a decree of judicial 
separation, to choose a new domicile for herself"; In re l\fackenzie, [19n], l Ch. 578. 
• Viscount Haldane thinks that there is no authority for holding that a married pair 
may have separate domiciles, and that the consequences would be extraordinary. Vis· 
count Finlay believes the statement in the Le Sueur case is wrong. Lord Dunedin regards 
Lord Cranwortli's remarks (supra) as self-contradictory. 
• l BLACKSTONE, 442. And this was the reason assigned by the decisions. \Villiamson 
v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619; Jenness v. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 335; Harteau 
v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651. 
10 Though Viscount Cave, in Lord Advocate v. Jeffrey, says that it appears to him 
that the rule as to the wife's domicile following that of the husband's "is a consequence 
of the union between husband and wife brought about by the marriage tie." 
11 This is admirably set out by Professor Beale.in an article in 2 So. L. QuART. 93. 
"'Kennedy v. Kennedy, 87 Ill. 250; Parrett v. Palmer, 8 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E. 
713; Mason v. Homer, 105 Mass. n6; Hackettstown Bank v. Mitchell, 28 N. J. L. 516; 
In re Hartman's Est., 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 6z Atl. 560. Contra: Thompson v. Love, 42 
Ohio St. 61, So. 
13 Kashaw v. Kashaw, 3 Cal. 312; Christies Succession, 20 La. Ann. 383; Stevens v. 
Allen, 139 I.,a. 658, 71 So. 936; Smith v. Smith, 19 Neb. 706, 28 N. W. 296; Yelverton 
v. Yelverton, l Sw. Tr. 574. 
"Loker v. Gerald, 157 Mass. 4z, 31 N. E. 709. . 
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for divorce at their last common domicile.15 Most courts go further, and 
say she may establish a separate domicile of her own to sue for divorce.16 
And the modem tendency seems to say that she may have this domicile, not 
for purposes of a divorce alone, but for. any purpose.17 And finally, some 
decisions say she may have a separate domicile when living apart from her 
husband without wrong on her part.ls 
Having gone this far, is there good reason for itmuiry into the question 
of the rightfulness of the woman's conduct in setting up her separate abode? 
Acquisition of domicile is, generally, a legal consequence of presence in a 
place plus the requisite intent. Two reasons might be urged why the ordi-
nary legal consequence should not follow when the domicile in question is 
that of a married woman. The first is her legal incapacity because of cover-
ture. That is hardly permissible argument nowadays, when a married woman 
may vote, serve on juries, hold, manage, and transfer property, sue and be 
sued, as freely as her husband. The other is that the policy of preserving 
family unity demands that legal recognition be denied the actual fact of sep-
arate reside:nce.19 There are several answers to this point. It is not incom-
patible with the existence of the family ties that there be continuous cohab-
itation.20 It also remains to be shown that denying legal effect to a separate 
residence by the wife will have any effect in deterring her from establishing 
one. No injustice is done the husband by recognizing the wife's separate 
domicile. If she has wrongfully left him he is not liable for support.21 
Recognition of that legal relation between a person and a place which 
is called domicile does not in general depend upon the purity of a party's 
co:nduct. He may secure one where not authorized ;22 motives are immate-
15 Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; Burtis v. Burtis, 161 Mass. 508, 37 N. E. 740, 
leaving it an open question whether the wife could acquire a new domicile. 
10 Hanberry v. Hanberry, 29 Ala. 719; Jenness v. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 
335; Stevens v. Allen, 139 La. 658, 71 So. 936; Sworoski v. Sworoski, 75 N. H. I, 70 
At!. n9; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. St. 375; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Craven v. Craven, 
27 Wis. 418. 
11 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619; Watertown v. Greaves, u2 Fed. 183; 
Gordon v. Yost, 140 Fed. 79; Fitch v. Huff, 218 Fed. 17; Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 
305, 36 At!. 282; White v. Glover, n6 N. Y. S. 1059. Contra: Estate of \Vickes, 128 
Cal. 270, 60 Pac. 867. Professor Beale disapproves of these enlargements of the doc· 
trine. See the discussion, 2 So. L. QUART. 93. 
10 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, semble; McKnight v. Dudley, 148 Fed. 204 (hus-
band becomes insane, wife may choose domicile); Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305, 3o 
At!. 282, semble; In re Geiser's Will, 82 N. J. Eq. 3n, 87 At!. 628, semble; Licht v. 
Licht, 150 N. Y. S. 643 (separation by agreement); Saperstone v. Saperstone, 131 N. 
Y. S. 241 (wife in New York permanently, husband refused admittance to the United 
States); In re Crosby's Estate, 148 N. Y. S. 1045 (long separation, cause not shown); 
Rundle v. Van Inwegen, 9 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 328; In re Florance, 7 N. Y. S. 57S 
(long separation); Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 \Vash. 213, II5 Pac. 88 (wife may have 
separate domicile "where there has been a mutual abandonment of the marriage rela-
tion"). 
10 See article by Professor Beale (note 7), and discussion by All>~rt Hewitt, 91 
CENT. L. ]OUR. 4, I4-
""See 28 HARv. L. REv. 196. 
21 Ogle v. Dershem, 86 N. Y. S. 1101. 
22 Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279. 
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rial.23 No one ever questioned the power of a husband to acquire a new 
domicile, even when deserting his family. Such acquisition does not confer 
privileges only; it also brings burdens as well. The question should be set--
tied without regard to the sex or marital condition of the actor.24 
Iowa City, Iowa. H. F. G. 
ADVJ>RSARY PARTIES-SAME PERSON AS BOTH PI.AINTD!F AND DEFENDANT. 
-Under the regulations promulgated by the Railroad Administration in 
1918, all actions for injury to persons or property growing out of the pos-
session or control of any railroad or system of transportation by the Director 
General of Railroads were required to be brought against the Director Gen· 
eral. ORDER No. 50. Some courts refused to follow this order on the 
ground that it was contrary to the statute creating federal control. Lavalle 
v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, (1919), 143 Minn. 74; Franke v. Chi· 
cago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1919), 170 Wis. 71. 
But Order No. 50 has been generally observed, and actions arising 
under federal control have usually been brought against the Director Gen-
eral. He was declared to be the agent of the United States through which 
it exercised "no divided but a complete possession and control" of all rail· 
roads for all purposes. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, (1918), 
250 u. s. 135, 148. . 
Under this situation a float belonging to the Central Railroad of New 
Jersey was rammed by a steam tug owned by the New York Central Rail· 
road, and the Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company, as insurer of the 
float, paid the loss and brought suit against the .wrongdoer under its right 
of subrogation. According to Order No. 50,_ the wrongdoer was the Director 
General of Railroads, who was operating the New York Central Railroad 
and its steam tug. But since the insurer, as subrogee, stood in the shoes of 
the insured, and the insured, under federal control, was the Director Gen-
eral of Railroads, the action presented in controversy between the Director 
General of Railroads as operator of the Central Railroad of New Jersey 
and the Director General of Railroads as operator of the New York Central 
Railroad. But no one can sue himself, even in another capacity, so that the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
the insured was absolutely without a remedy. Globe and Rtitgers Fire Insur-
an~e Co. v. Hines, (1921), 273 Fed. Rep. 774-
The court here invokes a rule which has often been quoted in both legal 
""Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619; Young v. Pollak, 8s A12. 43!>. · s So. 279; 
McConnell v. Kelley, 138 Mass. 372. 
24 It is not claimed, of course, that the power of a wife to establish a separate domi· 
cile at all times is authoritatively established. See Suter v. Suter, 72 Miss. 345, 16 So. 
673; Hood v. Hood, II Allen 196. The point is not even arguable until the wife 
becomes emancipated from the shackles placed on her by the common law. But there 
is a decision or two where, consciously or unconsciously, the court did go to the full 
extent of the position here suggested, and numerous dicta having the same tendency. 
See Smith v. Smith, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 2ss; Thompson v. Love, 42 Oh. St. 61, So; Colvin 
_ v. Reed, SS Pa. St. 37s; Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78, 9 S. W. 361; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 
39 Wis. 6s1, 6s9; Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 Wash. 213, us Pac. 88. 
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and equitable actions, but it has usually been deemed sufficient to state it as 
a sort of axiomatic formula, without attempting to give any reason for it. 
Thus, in Brya1i v. Kales, (1892), 3 Ariz. 423, the court said that the presence 
of adversary parties was so fundamental that if it appeared that the plaintiff 
was suing personally in a suit against himself as administrator, any judg-
ment entered would be "utterly void." Similar views seem to have been 
entertained in Barber v. Barber, (19n), 32 R I. 266, where a tax collector 
sued himself as town treasurer for services. In Grahame v. Harris, (1833), 
5 Gill & J. (Md.) 489, on the contrary, the court said that, although a man 
cannot properly bring an action against himself, and therefore the same 
party cannot regularly be placed on both sides of the case, this objection is 
a technical one. The rule is stated in D1c~Y ON PAR'tms '.l'O AC't!ONS (rule 5) 
that "The same person cannot be b9th plaintiff and defendant," and he says 
that this rule "scarcely requires explanation, and results immediately from 
the fact that it is impossible for a man himself to infringe upon his own 
rights." But in Connell v. Woodard, (I84I), 5 How. (Miss.) 665, 670, the 
court seemed less impressed with the inherent impossibility of such an action, 
for it said the rule was confined in its operation to natural ptrsons, which 
of course would destroy any claim it might have for being considered a 
fundamental concept of the law. Nor is the law entirely consistent in this 
respect when its asserts the identity of a party with himself in another 
capacity, when it seeks to defeat an action for want of adversary parties, 
and at the same time asserts want of identity where a person is joined with 
himself in another capacity when it seeks to defeat an action on the ground 
of misjoinder of causes of action. Grahame v. Harris, supra; I ENCY. PL. 
& Pn. I78, Tit. Actions. In the same way, the law finds no difficulty in dis-
covering a total lack of identity between a party in one capacity and the 
same party in another capacity when considering the effect of a judgment. 
As said in a recent case, Chandler v. White Oak Creek Lumber Co., (I914), 
I3I Tenn. 47, 50: 
"The reason that a judgment against a party suing as an individual 
is not an estoppel in a subsequent action in which he appears in another 
capacity or character is that in the latter case he is in contemplation 
of law a distinct person and a stranger to the prior proceedings and 
judgment. Rathbone v. Hconey, 58 N. Y. 463; Jennings v. Jones, 2 
Redf. Sur. 95." 
When we turn to equitable suits, the courts are found to be less 
inclined to consider this objection as insuperable. To be sure, the same 
broad statement of the rule as an axiomatic proposition is often met with. 
Thus, in 64 Sor.ICITORS' JoURNAI., (March, 1920), 318, it is said: 
"In the Annual Practice, under Ord. I6, rule 1, it is stated, 'Th~ 
same person cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same 
action, or an applicant and a respondent to the same summons.' This 
is treated as, what most people would consider it, a self-evident prop-
osition-at all events, no authority is cited for it. It is, however, 
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not uncommon to come across practitioners who suppose that the 
same person can be a plaintiff in one character and a defendant in 
another character in the same action." 
A note in 5 MASSACHUS~s 1<A.w QuARTERI,Y, 467, (Aug. 1920), quoting 
the above statement, cites a number of Massachusetts cases where the same 
rule was stated, but it also mentions others where the rule was in fact 
ignored without commeµt from court or parties. Thus, in Welch v. Blanch-
ard, (19n), 208 Mass. 523, each plaintiff is named three times as defendant 
on account of different interests in the trust fund. 
The theory of parties in equity would seem to make it a matter of minor 
concern whether a party is present in different capacities on the same side 
or on different sides of the suit. Thus, in Goss v. Suckling, (19u), 30 N. 
Z. L. R. 543, 545, the court said: "It is irregular, as it is unnecessary, in an 
equity suit as at common law, to make the same person both plaintiff and 
defendant." So, in 2 TARDY ON R£CEIVERS, 2045, the author says: "Although 
it is not good practice for a person in his representative capacity to sue 
himself in his individual capacity, as where a receiver of a corporation sues 
the directors, one of whom is himself, the bill is not demurrable on that 
ground alone." In support of this he cites Murphy v. Penniman, (1907), 
105 Md. 452, where it is shown that, while prior Maryland cases had con-
demned the practice of a party being on both sides of the case, yet the prac-
tice had to some extent prevailed, and that in a court of equity, where the 
rights of parties can be considered without much regard to the side on 
which they appear, "the rule is not of such importance as to require the 
court in all cases to dismiss the bill or sustain a demurrer to it because 
such pract_ice has been followed." Again, it has been pointed out that in 
partition suits, under modern statutes, it is immaterial that the groups of 
persons making up the parties plaintiff and the parties defendant contain a 
common member. Blaisdell v. Pray, (1878), 68 Me. 269; Senter v. De Bernal, 
(1869), 38 Cal. 637. 
The case under discussion, against the Director General of Railroads, 
was one in which there was but a single party on each side, and therefore 
it was one where the situation did not overtax the capacity of a common 
law judgment. It was also an actual adversary proceeding, for the insurance 
company, having paid up its loss, was entirely divorced from any com-
munity of interest with the Director General. In every respect there was 
complete antagonism. There was, therefore, no chance of a collusive suit. 
If this action could not be maintained the insurance company was without 
a remedy. Should the court, therefore, in view of the somewhat technical 
character of the objection made, have looked to the substantial nature of 
the controversy, as common law courts have often done, for example, in 
actions by use-plaintiffs, and have allowed the action to proceed? 
If, under the federal control act, the interests of the New York Central 
Railroad and of the Central Railroad of New Jersey were really antagon-
istic in the matter of the injury to the float, it would seem excessively tech-
nical to deny the only remedy possible merely because. of the general rule 
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adverted to. But it appears that their interests were not antagonistic. Under 
the statute, 40 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, Ch. 25, Sec. 12, all moneys received by 
the railroads during federal control became the property of the United 
States, and all operating disbursements, such as damages to be paid for 
injuries to property, were payable out of such moneys. Hence, when the 
insurance company paid the loss on the float the money went to the United 
States, and if the company were to be reimbursed as subrogee on its claim 
against the New York Central Railroad, the reimbursement would have to 
come out of money belonging to the United States. The United States, 
therefore, would in substance be required to pay back to the insurance com-
pany, by way of damages, the money which it had received from the insur-
ance company by way of indemnity. The question is, therefore, much more 
than one of adversary parties. It raises the very substantial point as to 
whether the insurance company was subrogated to any rights against the 
insured, because of the latter's fault in connection with the loss. On this 
point the law is clear. If the property is damaged by the tortious act of 
the insured or its agents or servants, the insurer, if liable under its contract, 
has no right of subrogation. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 
(1885), 117 U. S. 312. In Simpson v. Thompson, (1877), 3 App. Cas. 279, 
it was held by the House of Lords that where two ships, the property of 
the same owner, collide, and the underwriters pay the loss, they have no 
right of action against the owner of the ship that did the mischief, as he 
himself had no right, inasmuch as, being the owner of both vessels, any 
right he had must be a right of action against himself, which is an absurdity 
and a thing unknown to the law. To the same effect, see Globe Ins. Co. v. 
Sherlock, (1874), 25 Ohio St. 50, 68. 
In the case under review, therefore, the United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals appears to have come to the only possible decision, and the weak-
ness in the plaintiff's case was not due to a technical rule as to parties but 
to the fact that the federal statute, by consolidating all the railroads under 
the unified operation and control of the United States, subjected all insurers 
of railroad property to the additional burden of being deprived of any 
recourse through subrogation for injuries caused by the tortious operation 
of any other railroad property. Congress might have expressly saved such 
right of recourse by authorizing actions by insurers in all cases where such 
right of action would have existed prior to federal control, but it did not 
do so. The plaintiff may, therefore, properly consider the loss of its right 
of subrogation one of the burdens chargeable to the war. E. R. S. 
EVIDEN~CoNS'l'ITUT10NAI. LAw-SEARCRts AND SE!Zun:es.-The opinion 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Go11led v. United States, 41 
Sup. Ct. 261, suggests this further examination of the leading cases in that 
court for the discovery of the status of the rule as to the admissibility of 
evidence secured through violation of the Fourth Amendment against unlaw-
ful searches and seizures. The opinion in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 
585, following the much earlier case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
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left the profession in serious doubt a5 to whether, in cases where evidence 
was procured through violation of this Fourth Amendment, there was still 
opportunity for the application of the doctrine that illegality in procuring it 
does not go to admissibility of evidence. 
In Boyd's case the production of evidence was coerced through an order 
of court based upon an unconstitutional statute, and against an appropriate 
objection of defendant, was admitted. The Supreme Court held that the 
proceeding violated both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. In the 
Adams case a search warrant was issued to find gambling paraphernalia, 
and in the' execution of it certain private papers of the defendant, not cov-
ered by the warrant, were taken. So far as the opinion discloses, the ques-
tion first came to the court upon the objection of the defendant to the 
admission in evidence of the papers so taken. In the Supreme Court it was 
held that the evidence was correctly admitted; that the principle that ille-
gality in securing evidence does not go to its admissibility was controlling. 
The question was again before the Supreme Court in the case of Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. Weeks was indicted for misuse of the 
mails in the carrying on of a lottery. In his absence from home, officers, 
acting without warrant, entered defendant's house and carried away certain 
private papers of his there found. Before trial he petitioned the court for 
an order directing the return of the papers so taken. The petition was 
granted as to all seized which were not material as evidence upon the trial, 
but as to such it was denied. The papers retained were admitted in evidence 
upon the trial against the objection of the defendant that his constitutional 
rights were violated in their seizure and use as evidence. It is held by the -
Supreme Court that the evidence was inadmissible because secured through 
an unlawful seizure, and because, upon petition before trial, which was 
made, its restoration should have been ordered. The principal reliance is 
the Boyd case. The Adams case is distinguished upon the ground that in 
that case no antecedent petition for return was made. 
The Silverihorne Lumber Co. case (251 U. S. 385) followed. An officer, 
armed only with a subpoena duces temm, seized certain private papers of 
a corporation. "As soon as might be," application was made to the court 
for the return of the papers seized. They were returned, but not till copies 
and photographs of them had been taken and a new indictment framed upon 
the basis of the information so gained. A new subpoena d1u:es tecum was 
taken out and served, requiring the production on the trial of the original 
papers. The officers of .the corporation served refused to produce them. 
The court then made a special order for their production, which was dis.: 
obeyed, and contempt proceedings instituted, which were reviewed in the 
Supreme Court. It was held that the principle applied in the Weeks case 
forbids not alone the use upon the trial of the evidence gained through a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but any use of it for any purpose. 
Now follows the case fi!st mentioned, the Gouled case. Here certain 
private papers were taken by government officers by stealth and without 
warrant of any kind, and offered in evidence upon the trial of defendant 
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and admitted against his objection that they were seized in contravention 
of his privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, and were being 
used in violation of his privilege against self-crimination. The Supreme 
Court sustained both objections and excused the failure to make application· 
before trial for the return of the papers on the ground that the first notice 
of the taking came to defendant when they were offered in evidence. Other 
papers were taken while officers were executing search warrants. As to this 
latter taking, it is held that since the papers seized had only evidential value, 
their taking was an unlawful seizure; that a search warrant cannot be used 
to justify the entering of one's premises for the purpose only of searching 
for evidence of crime, and of seizing it if fottnd; that such is not the office 
of the search warrant. In the language of the court, 
"they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search 
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public, or the com-
plainant, may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the 
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders 
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that 
it may be taken." 
A very elastic statement. What is that "interest which the public may have 
in property'' which will justify a warrant? What is the condition "when a 
valid exercise of the police power" renders "possession by the accused 
unlawful"? Is it a wholly irrational interpretation of the language of the 
court to say that the public has a very real interest in the discovery, seizure 
and use of everything which may tend to establish guilt of crime? 
Reference might be here made to the case of Amos v. United States, 
41 Sup. Ct. 266, involving the unlawful seizure of whisky, and which was 
decided at the same time and upon the authority of the Goiiled case. 
The court has not yet said that the fact alone that evidentiary materials 
have been unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment will 
defeat the use of such materials in evidence. It has not yet said that if evi-
dentiary materials are seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and 
the person from whom they are seized, having knowledge of the seizure, 
fails to take any step for their return before they are offered in evidence, 
that his objection to their use in evidence as in violation of his right, under 
either the Fourth or the Fifth Amendment, will be good. Indeed, the exact 
contrary is held in the Adams case: The court still seems to consider the 
Adams opinion as correctly stating the law. At least the court has never 
purported to overrule it, unless by inference in a paragraph in the Gouled 
opinon, to be referred to later. The court in the Adams opinion discusses 
the Boyd case and attempts to show that it does not rule the state of facts 
presented in the Adams case, and yet the evidence allowed in that case was 
unlawfully seized. The Weeks opinion distinguishes the Adams case as 
being one where the court was first called upon to. consider the effect of 
unlawfulness of the seizure at the time it was offered upon the trial, and 
holds that the court will not try the question of lawfulness upon the trial. 
The opinion in the Silverthorne Lumber Cc. case states that the principle of 
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the Adams case is not applicable to the state of facts then before it, pre-
sumptively because the question was raised in an ancillary proceeding and 
not during the progress of the trial. In the Gouled case the· court holds 
that the fact that the defendant did not know of the unlawful seizure till 
the evidence was offered on the trial excused him from raising the question 
in some ancillary proceeding, which in the Weeks case seems to have been 
regarded as necessary. 
But the cure for all our troubles over this question lies in the rule 
announced in the latter part of the opinion in the Gouled case. The court 
is discussing the application of the rule, or alleged rule, that illegality in 
securing evidence does not affect its admissibility. The court says: 
"We think, * * * that it is a rule to be used to secure the ends 
of justice under the circumstances of each case; and where, in the 
progress of a trial, it becomes probable that there has been an uncon-
stitutional seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial court to enter-
tain an objection to their admission, or a motion for their exclusion, 
and to consider and decide the question as then presented, even where 
a motion to return the papers may have been denied before trial. A 
rule of practice must not be allowed, for any technical reason, to pre-
vail over a constitutional right." 
Verily, the line between what is legal and what is equitable is being 
lost in a not too unwelcome haze. The world moves and the legal section 
of it is catching on. It matters little what was said in Doe's or Roe's case. 
It matters not so much "what is the rule"; the concern rather is "what does 
the cause of justice call for." There is little danger yet, however, that the 
boast that ours is a government by law will become an idle one. 
V.H.L. 
THJS USEFULNESS OF !NTERv:ENTION AS A REMEDY IN ATTACHMENT.-
While rules of procedure are not saved from the rude band of the reformer 
by the "due process" guarantees of our constitutions, they do rest, never-
theless, under the very efficient protection of professional conservatism. 
Such rules are looked upon by the bench and bar as their own special con-
cern, and innovations in this field must maintain the burden of proving 
their character before both the lawyer members of the legislature and the 
lawyers and judges who interpret them in the course of litigation. It would 
be natural, therefore, to expect that a proposed reform in procedure would 
have to meet at least the possibility of two shrinking processes, one at the 
hands of the legislature and the other at the hands of the court. An inter-
esting case of the latter kind is found in Chase v. Waslztenaw Circuit Judge, 
(Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 63. 
In that case the petitioner, who claimed that her property had been 
wrongfully attached as the property of another sought to intervene in the 
attachment suit for the purpose of freeing it from the lien of the wrongful 
levy. The Michigan statute passed in 1915 (C. L. 1915, Sec. 12362) allowed 
an intervention in any action by anyone claiming an interest in the litiga-
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tion. The court held that the "petitioner does not assert any interest in the 
litigation, and only seeks to free her property from a claimed wrongful 
attachment." Therefore, it was held that she could not intervene, but must 
let the attachment proceedings take their course against her property. 
A contrary decision would have secured to the people of Michigan a 
much needed simplification of procedure and could have been justified on 
both reason and authority much more easily than the decision that was made. 
A study of contemporary American practice in such cases discloses the fol-
lowing interesting features. 
In the first place, it appears that the widespread recognition of the great 
practical value of intervention in attachment cases has resulted in the enact-
ment of a large number of statutes expressly providing for intervention by 
the owner of property claimed to have been wrongfully attached as the 
property of another. Even such conservative jurisdictions as Illinois (l11il-
- lard & Co. v. May, (1889), 130 Ill. 87); Mississippi (Dreyfus v. Mayet', 
(18g1), 6g Miss. 282); Florida G. S., 1906, Sec. 2129); Georgia (Com>, 19u, 
Secs. 5n5, 5n6), and West Virginia (Capehart's E.z-'r v. Dowery, (1877), 
10 W. Va. 130), which have refused to accept any thoroughgoing reform in 
pleading and still adhere to the common law system, have, nevertheless, 
enacted statutes expressly authorizing such intervention in attachment cases. 
Kansas (Bodwell v. Heaton, (1888), 40 Kan. 36); Arkansas (S. & H. ST., 
1894 Sec. 4o6), and Oklahoma (Miller v. Campbell Commissio1i Co., (1903), 
13 Okla. 75), states usually more friendly to such reforms, have similar 
statutes. 
In the next place, it appears that the value of such a remedy has appealed 
so strongly to a number of courts that they have, in the absence of any 
statute at all on the subject, authorized the practice as an exercise of their 
inherent power to regulate their own procedure. This was the case in Sims 
v. Goettle, (188o), 82 N. C. 268; in United States v. Neely, (1906), 146 Fed. 
764, and in Daniels v. Soloma1i, (18g7), II App. D. C. 163, the latter asserting 
the existence of a similar judicial attitude in Maryland. In the Neely case, 
supra, the court saw no difficulty in the matter at all, and approved the 
intervention on the simple ground that "in that way a decision can be 
reached much more quickly and economically than in any other." 
Lastly, it appears that a large number of states have general statutes 
of intervention substantially similar to the Michiga1i statute, and the deci-
sions of courts acting under these statutes have been almost unanimous in 
favor of allowing such an intervention in attachment cases. Such was the 
decision in each of the following cases: Patton v. Madison Nat. Bank, 
(1907), 126 Ky. 46g; City Nat. Bank. v. Crahaii, (1907), 135 Iowa, 230; 
Hamw1i v. Comiett, (18g7), 10 Col. App. 171; Dennis v. Kolni, (1900), 131 
Cal. 91; Potlach Lmnber Co. v. Runkle, (1909), 16 Ida. 192; Field v. Harri-
so11, (1868), 20 La. Ann. 4n; Lee v. Bradlr!e, (1820), 8 Mart. (La.) 20; 
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Heckler, (1914), 44 Utah, 64. The last case 
above cited contains a very thorough study of the question, and demonstrates 
the simplicity, directness and speed with which the conflicting claims to 
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attached property can be determined by this method. In two states alone, 
so far as we have discovered, Nebraska (Dunker v. Jacobs, (1907), 79 Neb. 
435), and New Mexico (Meyer & Sons Co. v. Black, (1888), 4 N. Mex. 352), 
has this use of the remedy of intervention under general intervention statute~ 
like that in Michigan been disapproved. E. R. S. 
LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR NtGLIGENC:S OF SERVAN'!' RJ>'l'uRNING FROM PER-
SONAL ERRAND.-It is clearly established by a long and uniform line of deci-
sions that a master is liable for the result of his servant's negligence when 
the servant is acting within the scope of his employment. See collection of 
the judicial statements of this rule in LABATT ON MASTER AND SJ>R\'ANT, Vol. 
6, pages 6695 to 6698. This rule is obviously founded on the great principle 
of ;ocial duty, that every man, in the management of his own affairs, 
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, sh.all so conduct them as 
not to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sustains dam-
age, he shall answer for it. Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 4 Met. (Mass.) 
49, 55. It is not the rule itself, however, but its application, that gives rise 
to doubt in determini~g particular cases. The difficulty is in deciding when 
the servant is, and when he is not, acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, and it seems doubtful if any fixed formula could be worked out that 
would solve the question in all cases. _ With reference to establishing such 
a criterion of liability, it has been laid down that the servant's agency extends 
to doing everything reasonably necessary for the efficient performance of 
his master's business in the station to which his master has appointed him. 
C1ellimore v. Savage South Africa Company, [1903], 2 I. R. 589. But such 
an attempt to establish a formula of liability cannot be of any great assist-
ance in deciding cases, for it still leaves the question of reasonable necessity 
to be. determined. 
In a recent New York case, Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., (1921) 
132 N. E. 97, a truck driver was ordered by the master to go from the mill 
to the freight yards for the purpose of loading some paint, and to return 
immediately. After loading the truck the driver found some waste pieces 
of wood whic~ he loaded on the truck and carried to his sister's house, four 
blocks in the opposite direction. He started to return, on a course that 
v.:ould carry him past the freight yards, and before reaching the yards he 
negligently ran down the plaintiff. It was held, by a divided court, that the 
servant must be deemed on his master's business at some point in the return, 
which point, in view of all the circumstances, he had reached. 
In an extremely forceful dissenting opinion Justice McLaughlin says, 
after speaking of the result reached by the majority of the court: 
"I am unable to see how this conclusion can be· reached as a 
matter of law. Nor do I think the facts would justify a finding to 
this effect. The uncontradicted facts show, as it seems to me, that 
Million, at the place where and time when the accident occurred, was 
not acting for the defendant. * * * He was doing an independent act 
of his own, and outside the service for which he had been .employed." 
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The dissenting opinion would seem to present the better view on prin-
ciple, and it is interesting to note the state of the authorities on this ques-
tion. A marked conflict of authority is shown by an examination of the 
cases, even in the New York decisions. The case of Jones v. Weigand, n9 
N. Y. Supp. 441, cited in the majority opinion, seems to support the con-
clusion reached, though in that case the driver merely took a circuitous route 
in reaching his destination, the purpose of his detour being to see a friend. 
Williams v. Koehler et al., 58 N. Y. Supp. 863, seems to support the principle 
case. See also Geraty v. National Ice Co., 16o N. Y. 658. In Riorda1i v. Gas 
Cons11mers' Ass'1i, 4 Cal. App. 639, the master was held liable for injuries 
caused by a runaway horse which his servant, after having driven it to his 
own home during the lunch hour for his own accommodation, had negligently 
failed to fasten. But in that case the decision went off on the ground that 
the servant had charge of the horse for the defendant during the noon 
hour as well as during working hours. On almost the same state of facts 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held the master not liable. M cCar-
thy v. Timmins, 178 Mass. 378. 
The case of Schoenherr v. Hartfield, 158 N. Y. Supp. 388, seems to be 
in direct conflict with the principal case. In that case the servant had taken 
the master's car for the purpose of visiting his wife. While returning, the 
car struck and killed the plaintiff's testator, and it was held that the owner 
was not liable. Da1iforth v. Fisher, 75 N. H. III, is directly in point, and 
supports the view taken in Schoenherr v. Hartfield, supra. It was there held 
that where, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur is returning from an 
errand of his own to reach the place to which he had been directed to take 
the machine, the owner is not liable. To the same effect are Provo v. Conrad, 
130 Minn. 412, and Patterson v. Kates, 152 Fed. 481. See also note in L. R. 
A. 1916 A957· 
In Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399, it was laid down 
by the court that "where a servant steps aside from his master's business, 
and does an act not connected with the business, which is hurtful to another 
* * * the master is not liable for such act." If this be the correct rule, it 
seems difficult to justify the principal case, for here the servant had stepped 
aside from his master's business to do an errand of his own not in any way 
connected with his employment. The court evidently held the view that the 
servant re-entered the master's service the moment he started on his return 
journey, and that there was no distinction between the facts presented and 
the case where the servant merely makes a detour in reaching his destina-
tion. It must be admitted that this view has some authority to support it, 
but the view taken in the dissenting opinion seems to be with the weight 
of authority. P. W. G. 
